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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS EAGER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MICHAEL WILLIS, and 
CHARLES WILLIS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10335 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries arising 
from a pedestrian auto collision at the intersection 
of 300 West and Highway 91 in St. George, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On a jury verdict, the lower court entered judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defen-
dants in the amount of $10,000.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek a reversal of the judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff and a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The accident happened at about 8 :25 a.m. on 
April 9, 1964 (Tr. 22) at the intersection of 100 
North and 300 West in St. George, Utah. 100 North 
is Highway 91 in St. George, Utah. Highway 91 is 
approximately 67 feet 3 inches wide, (Tr. 26) and 
there is a double yellow line separating east and vvest 
bound traffic. Highway 91 is marked for four-lane 
traffic. 
The sun was shining from the east and, accord-
ing to the defendant driver and to Officer Hutchings, 
who investigated the accident, it created a problem 
when you were traveling east on Highway 91 (Tr. 
28). Highway 91 was posted for a 30-mile speed 
limit (Tr. 28). 
There are crosswalks, across Highway 91, on the 
east and west side of 300 West. The crosswalk on 
the east side of 300 "\Vest is approximately 10 feet 
wide (Tr. 26). "\Vest of the intersection in front 
of the 0. K. vVelders, there is a sign saying "School 
Crossing", and Exhibit D-3 depicts the area. 
At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was 
acting as a traffic guard policeman and the def end-
ant, Michael Willis, was driving an automobile east 
on Highway 91 on his way to Dixie College where he 
was a student. Michael \Villis was driving at a speed 
of about 20 to 25 miles per hour, (Tr. 61) and was 
driving almost directly into the sun (Tr. 62). He was 
in the inside eastbound traffic lane (Tr. 61). When 
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Mr. Willis first saw Mr. Eager, he and a little girl 
(Jane Cannon) were right in front of him (Tr. 62). 
He immediately applied his brakes and stopped his 
ca1· with part of the vehicle in the crosswalk. Mr. 
Willis saw Mr. Eager about a second before the col-
lision (Tr. 68). Just immediately prior to the acci-
dent, Mr. Willis had glanced to the north side of the 
sti·eet and had observed some friends and waved. 
Mr. Eager, the plaintiff, went to work at about 
8 :30 in the morning as a traffic guard. On the morn-
ing of Ap1·il 9, 1964, he arrived and turned on the 
light in the school crossing sign facing east-bound 
traffic (Tr. 33). When he reached the north-east 
corner of the intersection, he saw a littie girl stand-
ing and took her hand to cross Highway 91 to walk 
south across 91 in the east crosswalk at 3rd West. 
As Mr. Eager started to cross Highway 91, there was 
no ti·affic approaching from the east, and no traffic 
was moving north or south on 300 \Vest (Tr. 50). The 
only ca1· he observed approaching the area was the 
vehicle driven by Mr. Willis, which was down near 
the 0. K. 'Nelders sign on Highway 91 (Tr. 49). Mr. 
Willis was driving east, south of the center of the 
street. (Tr. 51) \Vhen Mr. Eager got in the center of 
the street, he let loose of Jane Cannon's hand and 
waved with both hands at Mr. ·wmis to stop. He did 
not recall saying anything to Jane Cannon and did 
not make any effort to step back or stay in the west-
bound traffic lanes. As he kept waving to Mr. Willis, 
he observed that he was not seen, and at that moment, 
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noticed that Jane Cannon had continued to walk 
southward across the street. He jumped out abruptly 
to reach her (Tr. 52), and before he could return to 
the north side of the center of the street, the accident 
occurred (Tr. 52). Mr. Eager testified that he say· 
Mr. Willis looking to his left and that he watched 
him for maybe two seconds, and at that time he could 
see Mr. Willis did not see him. Mr. Eager abruptly 
stepped in front of the only car on either street when 
he observed the driver was not watching in his direc-
tion (Tr. 51). 
Exhibit P-2 shows that Mr. Thomas Eager was 
hospitalized from April 9th to and including April 
14th. His total hospital bill was $119.70 and in 
addition to that he had a doctor's bill from Dr. Mc-
Laren Ruesch. It was stipulated by the defendant 
that the fair and reasonable value of the medical 
services, including doctor and hospital bill was $252.-
70. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was 
working as a crossing guard, and was receiving 
$100.00 a month as wages. In the accident, his left 
fibula was broken near the lower end, and his doctor 
testified that he had post-traumatic arthritis. After 
the accident, he was bothered some by pain, but testi-
fied that at the time of the trial, he was sleeping 
fairly good and that he was not taking any drugs 
such as aspirin or buff erin for pain . He has not re-
ceived any medical treatment subsequent to June of 
1964 (Tr. 58). Mr Eager testified he took no medi-
cation for pain, because aspirin and bufferin both-
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ered him, but he testifed that while in the hospital, 
he was given a sleeping pill and that didn't oother 
him in any way (Tr. 40). Dr. Ruesch testified the 
fibula was well-healed and every bit as strong at the 
time of the trial, as before the accident (Tr. 19). He 
indicated that the arthritis would not keep him from 
walking around the house and so on, but that it would 
prohibit prolonged walking. 
The Complaint, (R. 1) alleges that the defend-
ant driver was careless and negligent in the manner 
in which he operated his motor vehicle, and that the 
plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by said 
negligence and carelessness ( R. 2). The defendants, 
in their Answer, denied negligence and affirmative-
ly, as a defense, alleged the accident was solely or 
proximately caused by the plaintiff's own negligence, 
(R. 4). 
The plaintiff gave four requested instructions 
on damages, and gave no requests on negligence or 
contributory negligence (R. 26, 31). The defend-
ants requested 17 instructions, all of which were 
stock instructions from JIFU, in whole or in part, 
except two. The court gave 31 instructions. 
In Instruction No. 1, the court instructed the 
defendant has admitted the accident but denies the 
plaintiff's claimed injuries and affirmatively alleges 
that the accident was solely caused or proximately 
contributed to by the plaintiff's own negligence (R. 
33) . This instruction was excepted to upon the 
ground it failed to show the defendant denied negli-
gence (Tr. 83). 
The court gave Instruction No. 9. It was ex-
cepted to upon the grounds there was no evidence of 
speed on the part of the defendant driver (Tr. 83), 
and that further, the last sentence of the instruction 
was incorrect, in that it invited the jurors to weigh 
the damages before considering the question of con-
tributory negligence (Tr. 84). 
In Instruction No. 12, the court gave its instruc-
tions on damages ( R. 44) , and this instruction was 
excepted to (Tr. 84), on the ground that the instruc-
tion on damages should have been given at the end of 
the charge, and prior to instructions on liability is-
sues. 
In Instruction No. 15, the court instructed the 
driver of a motor vehicle has the duty to observe and 
com ply with the lawful order and direction of any 
police officer invested by law, with authority to 
direct, control and regulate traffic ( R. 48). This 
mandatory instruction was excepted to upon the 
ground that the driver of an automobile has only 
the duty to observe and comply with the lawful orders 
and directions of police officers, if in the exercise of 
ordinary care, the driver could see and have a reason-
able opportunity to obey, and that the instruction 
was prejudicially erroneous, because it placed an ab-
solute duty to obey upon the part of the defendant, 
without opportunity to do so. 
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In Instruction No. 17, the court instructed it is 
the duty of a driver of an automobile to yield the 
right of way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway 
within a marked crosswalk, and that failure to so 
yield the right of way to a pedestrian in any such 
crosswalk, constitutes negligence (R. 50). This in-
struction was objected to as being highly prejudicial 
(Tr. 86) on the grounds that in this instruction, the 
court was directing negligence against the defendant 
and that the instruction was not proper under the 
facts of this case, as the evidence showed the plaintiff 
abruptly stepped into the path of the defendant's 
Yehicle at a time when the defendant's car was so 
close that there was no opportunity for him to yield 
the right of way, and at a time when it was impossi-
ble fo1· the defendant to yield the right of way to the 
plaintiff. 
In plaintiff's closing argument, counsel for the 
plaintiff told the jury they were not to consider 
whether or not the defendant was able to pay, (Tr. 
81) and reminded the jurors that he wanted them to 
put themselves in the position of the plaintiff in eval-
uating the evidence. Plaintiff's counsel said: 
"The amounts are the lack of enjoyment 
of things that he has enjoyed before and can-
not do, do now on acount of the injuries sus-
tained bv the admitted negligence of the de-
fendant; I feel you're entitled, Gentlemen of 
the Jury, to figure yourself in somewhat of the 
situation of the -
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MR. BERRY: I object to this as improper 
type of argument, asking the jury to consider 
themselves in the situation of the plaintiff. 
That is asking for sympathy and passion and 
is not proper. 
THE COURT: Well, I have already in-
structed the Jury what counsel says is not 
evidence. It is merely argument. As to its 
propriety, I'm uncertain. Go ahead, Mr. Pic-
kett." (Tr. 78, Tr. 79) 
The amount of the verdit was the amount of the 
defendant's insurance, $10,000.00. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN 
STATING THE ISSUBS IN INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
The plaintiff, in his Complaint, alleged negli-
gence, and the defendant, in his Answer, denied neg-
ligence. There was no Pre-trial Order. The first 
issue upon which the plaintiff should have had the 
burden of proof: vVas the defendant driver negli-
gent? 
However, Instruction No. 1 relieved the plain-
tiff of proving negligence on the part of the defend-
ant as an issue. Instruction No. 1 read as follows: 
"Instruction No 1 - You are instructed 
that this is an action brought by the plaintiff 
to recover from the defendant for injuries al-
legedly received by the plaintiff as the result 
of a collision between the plaintiff as a pedes-
8 
trian school crosswalk patrolman who was es-
corting a school child across Highway 91 at 
Third West Street in St. George, Utah, on 
April 9, 1964, and the defendant who was at 
such time and place operating a motor vehicle. 
T~e plaintiff cl~ims injuries to his per-
son, pam and suffermg and loss of earnings, 
all to a total claim in the sum of $25,000 and 
for expenses incurred for hospitalization and 
medical treatment in the sum of $252. 70. 
The def end.ant has admitted the accident, 
but denies the p"laintijj's claimed injuries and 
affirmatively alleges that the accident was 
solely caused or proximately cantributed to by 
the p"laintiff's own negligence." (R. 33) (Em-
phasis Added) 
The objection is to the part of Instruction No. 1 
underlined in last sentence. It releases the plaintiff 
from proving negligence and states the defendant's 
only defense is the affirmative defense of contribu-
tory negligence. Instruction No. 1 did not contain 
the usual cautionary phrase that the instruction is 
only a statement of the claims of the parties, and not 
evidence, and thus, the jurors are entitled to treat 
this instruction as stating more than merely issues 
or contentions of parties. This instruction gave 
plaintiff's counsel an advantage, unfairly, in argu-
ing the case during closing argument. Plaintiff's 
counsel told the jury the defendant admitted negli-
gence (Tr. 78). 
Why shouldn't the plaintiffs' counsel have ar-
gued the case to the jury as he did in view of this 
instruction. There is no reason to undertake the 
9 
burden of proving an issue the court indicates your 
client need not prove The jury probably treated In-
struction No. 1 as freeing the plaintiff from proving 
negligence. However, at best, they could have treated 
the instruction as merely a requirement on the part 
of the defendant to prove he was not negligent. This, 
of course, is not the law. 
The issues of negligence was material. The de-
fendant driver was driving into the sun which ob-
scured his vision. When the accident happened, there 
was no traffic on Highway 91, or in the area ap-
proaching the intersection on 300 West. The plain-
tiff started to cross the street with a little girl, Jane 
Cannon, walking between her and the defendant's 
car. Mr. Eager let loose of her hand when he ap- 1 
proached double yellow line dividing east and west-
bound traffic on Highway 91, and endeavored to sig-
nal the defendant driver to slow or stop. After he 
observed the defendant driver for some two seconds 
and saw that he was not seen, he then jumped into the 
path of the defendant's vehicle abruptly to reach the 
child which had proceeded ahead. The posted speed 
limit in the area was 30 miles an hour; the defendant 
said he was going 20 to 25 miles per hour. He stopped 
his car in the crosswalk where the accident occurred, 
and the investigating police officer, Mr. Hutchings, 
agreed there was no evidence of speed on the part 
of the defendant driver. 
Instruction No. 9 ( R. 41) does not cure the error 
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complained of in Instruction No. 1 because it fails to 
tell the jury the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove 
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. At 
best, Instruction No. 9 presents a conflict between 
two instructions. Instruction No. 4 ( R. 36) does not 
correct the prejudicial error, because no burden of 
proving negligence was placed on the plaintiff by the 
virtue of giving Instruction No. 1. 
Nor does Instruction No. 11 rectify the preju-
dicial error, because it became unnecessary to claim 
the defendant was negligent by virtue of the giving 
of Instruction No. 1. 
In summary, it is submitted it was prejudicial 
error to fail to advise the jury the defendant denied 
negligence and that burden of proof on this point, 
was upon the plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN STATING THE DUTIES OWED TO PLAIN-
TIFF. NO. 17. 
Although it seems probable the issue of negli-
gence was eliminated in the lawsuit by the giving of 
Instruction No. 1, it appears the court further hid the 
issue of negligence in the lawsuit by giving Instruc-
tions No. 15 and No. 17. Effectively, these instruc-
tions directed negligence against the defendant, al-
though the court did not rule as a matter of law, the 
clef endant was negligent. 
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Instruction No. 15 reads as follows: 
"The driver of a motor vehicle has the 
duty to observe and comply with the lawful 
order and direction of any police officer inves-
ted by law with the authority to direct, control 
and regulate traffic." (I. 48) ' 
Instruction No. 17 reads as follows: 
"It is the duty of the driver of an auto-
mobile to yield the right of way to a pedestrian 
crossing the roadway within a marked cross-
walk. Failure to do so yield the right of way 
to a pedestrian in any such crosswalk consti-
tutes negligence." (R. 50) 
Instruction No. 15 was a misstatement of the 
law, as applied to the facts of this case, because it 
indicates the driver of a motor vehicle owes an ab-
solute duty to observe and comply with the lawful 
orders and directions of the police officer. At the 
time, exceptions were taken to this instruction, the 
court said it was copied from the State Statutes, 
(Tr. 86). The court was referring to Section 41-6-13, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and that statute reads as 
follows: 
"Obedience to police officer - No person 
shall wilfully fail or refuse to comply with any 
lawful order or direction of any police officer 
invested by law with authority to direct, con-
trol or regulate traffic". (Emphasis added) 
Since the statute refers to a wilful act, it is hard 
to see how it is authority for the propositions stated 
in Instruction No. 15 where the word "wilfully" was 
excluded. 
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In Charvoz vs. Cottrell ( 1961) 12 U. 2d 25, 361 
P. 2d 516, our court said: 
"The defendant testified that when he 
first saw the decedent, the latter was in the 
crosswalk approaching the dividing line of 
17th South. He immediately applied his 
brakes, but could not stop in time to avoid 
hitting the deceased. He also testified that the 
decedent, after being first observed, walked 
some six feet or more across the dividing line 
and into the defendant's line of traffic Plain-
tiff contends that deceased had the legal right 
of way and therefore, defendant was negligent 
as a matter of law. It is well settled that 
statutes or ordinances giving pedestrians the 
right of way at street crossings create a pre-
ferential, but not an absolute right in their 
favor. Before the duty of a driver to yield the 
right of way arises, he must be in a situation 
whereby he is either aware of the presence of 
a pedestrian within the crosswalk, or should 
have, in the exercise of ordinary care, become 
aware of the pedestrian's presence in time to 
yield the right of way". (Emphasis added) 
In the Louisville Railroad Company vs. Offutt's 
Administratrix (1932), 55 S.W. 2d 391, 246 Ky. 508, 
where the question of striking a pedestrian police 
officer was presented, the court said the bus driver 
owed the traffic officer the same duty as regards 
warning, lookout and speed as owed to other ordinary 
pedestrians. 
It is the appellant's contention that the driver of 
a motor vehicle has the duty to yield the right of way 
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to a pedestrian, but only when he is in a situation 
where he is aware of the presence of the pedestrian 
within the crosswalk, or should have been aware, in 
the exercise of ordinary care, of the pedestrian's 
presence in time to yield the right of way. 
The question of the defendant driver's duty to 
yield the right of way should have been decided by the 
jury and not by the court, because the evidence 
showed the defendant driver was driving into the 
sun which obstructed his vision, and further showed 
that the plaintiff abruptly jumped into the path of 
the defendant's vehicle when it was so close as to 
make it impossible for the defendant, Mr. Willis, to 
yield. 
This instruction was clearly in conflict with 
Instruction No. 16 which was a correct statement 
of the law as to the duty to yield the right of way to 
a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Instruction No. 17 
further unbalances the charge in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant driver, Mr. Willis. 
No claim was made that Mr. Eager, the plain-
tiff. was not in the crosswalk. Mr. Willis, the de-
fendant, admitted he was in the crosswalk, and it was 
admitted by the plaintiff that he jumped abruptly 
into the path of Mr Willis' vehicle. Under the facts 
of this case, the giving of this instruction had a fur-
ther prejudicial effect in directing negligence against 
the defendant driver, and again, this instruction was 
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in conflict with Instruction No. 16, which was a 
correct statement of the law. 
In Coombs vs. Perry (1954), 2 U. 2d 381, 275 P. 
2d 680, where a pedestrian was struck in the evening 
twilight in a crosswalk in an accident in Ogden, and 
where the defendant driver testified he had not seen 
her before striking her, the court said the question 
of the driver's negligence in keeping a proper lookout 
for the pedestrian in the crosswalk and in affording 
her the right of way to which she was entitled, was 
for the jury to decide. Where vision is obscured it is 
jury question as to the negligence of the defendant 
driver in failing to keep a proper lookout, or in fail-
ing to see a pedestrian in a crosswalk. Instruction 
No. 16 (R. 49) was a proper statement of the duty 
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant driver, Mr. 
"Willis. However, it is surely certain this instruction 
was in conflict with Instructions No. 15 and 17 and 
was sandwiched in-between in the charge. 
It appears the rule of law in Utah is that if the 
court gives conflicting instructions on a material 
point of law, it will be presumed prejudicial error 
was committed by the lower court. 
In Sorenson vs. Bell (1917), 107 P. 72, 51 U. 
262, the court reversed a verdict for the defendant 
where erroneous instructions on the burden of proof 
we1·e given in charge. In Sorenson vs. Bell, supra, the 
court said: 
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"***True, counsel point to other portions 
of the charge wherein they contend the rule 
respecting the burden of proof is correctly 
stated . If that be conceded, it still does not 
minimize, much less cure, the probable error 
contained in the foregoing instruction. At 
most, it would merely present a case of where 
two instructions were given on the same sub-
ject, one proper and the other improper. Where 
such is the case and the evidence is conflicting 
upon the subject covered by the instructions or 
is such that more than one conclusion is per-
missable, and the record leaves it in doubt 
whether the jury followed the instruction that 
is proper or the one that was improper, then 
but one result is legally permissable in this 
court, and that is to reverse the judgment and 
grant a new trial to the agrieved party***." 
California holds the only proper thing to do is 
to grant a new trial if you can't tell which instruction 
the jury followed. In Galway vs. Guggolz (1931) 4 
P. 2d 290, 11 Cal. App. 639, in a case involving con-
flicting instructions of right of way at an intersec-
tion, the California court held a new trial should be 
granted. And in Francis vs. the City and County of 
San Francisco ( 1955) 282 P. 2d 496, 44 C. 2d 335, 
where a pedestrian brought suit for injury sustained 
while struck in a crosswalk by a bus and where an 
erroneous instruction on contributory negligence was 
given, the California Supreme Court said: 
"The giving of an erroneous instruction is 
not cured by the giving of other correct in-
structions, where the effect is simply to pro-
16 
uce a clear conflict in the instructions, and it 
: not possible to know which instruction was 
)llowed by the jury in arriving at a verdict. 
v estberg vs. Willde, 14 Cal 2d 360, 371, 94 P. 
d 590; Goodwin vs. Foley, supra, 75 Cal. App. 
d 195, 200, 170 P. 2d 503 and cases cited. An 
x:amination of the entire charge to the jury 
oes not convince us that the error complained 
f was cured by other instructions." 
Bernaski vs. Lindahl (1956) 307 P. 2d 510, 
553, where a bus passenger brought an action 
,onal injuries sustained in a collision with de-
's vehicle, the court on appeal held the lower 
roperly granted a new trial where it gave 
:tent instructions, one holding the defendant 
t negligent as a matter of law for violating 
r statute, and the other instructing the jury 
~y must find the defendant motorist guilty of 
1ce by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Oklahoma, in Thompson vs. Chamblee 
, 245 P. 2d 716, 206 Okl. 602, where instruct-
rere clearly conflicting and confusing, the 
~Id granting a new trial was proper. 
Graham vs. Atlantic Coast Line R. Company 
, 82 S.E. 2d 346, 240 N.C. 338, the court said 
~onflicting instructions to the jury on a ma-
oint were given, one correct and the other in-
. a new trial must be granted. The court said: 
"As stated by Barnhill, J., (C.J.), in 
:;tate vs. Overcash, 226 N.C. 632, 39 S.E. 2d 
~10, 811: 'When there are conflicting instruc-
17 
tions to the jury upon a material point, the 
one correct and the other incorrect, a new trial 
niust be granted.' We may not assume that the 
jurors possessed such discriminating know-
ledge of the law as would enable them to dis-
regard the erroneous and to accept the correct 
statement of the law. We must assume instead 
that the jury, in coming to a verdict, was in-
fluenced by that part of the charge that Wl1$ 
incorrect." (Emphasis added) 
In Lucas vs. Kirk ( 1963), 275 Ala 20, 151So.2d 
7 44, the court held a misstatement of the law must, 
of necessity be reversible error, even when con-
strued in light of other charges given at appellant's 
request and oral charge to the jury on correct law. 
In Pettingell vs. Moede (1954), 271 P. 2d 1038, 
129 Colo. 484, the Colorado court, following a line of 
decisions, held an erroneou~ instruction was not 
cured by a correct instruction on the law. 
In Arizona, in leronimo vs. Hagerman ( 1963), 
380 P. 2d 1013, 93 Ariz. 357, where conflicting in-
structions were given in an automobile accident case, 
involving a collision at an intersection, the court sit-
ting En Banc, said that even though correct instruc-
tions were given, and even though the instructions 
were considered as a whole, that the giving of an 
unequivocal, erroneous instruction was not cured by 
mere giving of a correct instruction concerning the 
same subject matter. 
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m 41-6-78 of the Utah Code Annotated 
s as follows : 
"41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. -· 
When traffic control signals are not in 
~e or not in operation the driver of a vehicle 
11 yield the right of way, slowing down or 
)ping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian 
;;sing the roadway within a crosswalk when 
pedestrian is upon the half of the roadway 
in which the vehicle is traveling, or when 
pedestrian is approaching so closely from 
opposite half of the roadway as to be in 
tger, but no pedestrian shall suddenly leave 
irb or other place of safety and walk or run 
) the path of a vehicle which is so close that 
s impossible for the driver to yield. This 
vision shall not apply under the conditions 
ted in Section 41-6-78 (b) ." 
~r Instruction No. 1 7 as given by the trial 
defendant driver, Mr. Willis, had an abso-
to yield the right of way to the plaintiff, 
r. The instruction does not take into con-
. that in this situation, vision was obscured 
ing sun, and that Mr. Eager abruptly and 
stepped into the path of the defendant's 
iaking it impossible for a collision to be 
Under Instruction No. 17, a driver could be 
tious, and still be negligent in failing to 
~ight of way Under certain circumstances, 
fn No. 17 would be appropriate. If you 
;he defendant driver had no excuse for not 
not yielding to the pedestrian, Instruction 
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No. 17 certainly would be proper. However, when 
the evidence shows vision was obstructed and that 
plaintiff moved abruptly and suddenly into the path 
of the vehicle involved, it is submitted that Instruc-
tion No. 17 was erroneously given and that the effect 
was highly prejudicial because: 
(a) It made proof of contributory negligence 
impossible, and 
(b) It made failure to yield right of way to 
any pedestrian in any crosswalk under 
any circumstances, negligence. 
It is submitted that where a court gives incon-
sistent and conflicting instructions on the duty owed 
on seeing and yielding the right of way to a pedes-
trian, the court, in effect, delegates to the jury tfle 
duty of deciding the law as well as the facts, and does 
unavoidably commit prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
THREE TIMES IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
Instruction No. 9 reads as fallows: 
"Before you can return a verdict for the 
plaintiff, you must find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that each of the fallowing two 
propositions are true : 
Proposition Number One 
That the defendant was negligent in 
the operation of the motor vehicle which 
20 
he was driving at the time of the acci-
dent in one or more of the following par-
ticulars: 
A. In driving too fast for 
existing conditions, 
B. In failing to keep a proper 
lookout for pedestrians m 
the crosswalk. 
Proposition Number Two 
That the said negligence of the de-
fendant, if any, was the proximate cause 
of the occurrence and the injury to the 
plaintiff. 
If you find that the two foregoing propo-
sitions are true, you should determine the 
damages sustained by the plaintiff according 
to the instruction hereinafter given to you on 
that subject." (Emphasis added) (. 41) 
Instruction No 9 was prejudicially erroneous 
for three reasons: 
1. It was a formula instruction not considering 
all of the issues in the case, 
2. It told the jury to consider damages without 
considering contributory negligence, 
3. There is no evidence the defendant driver 
was going too fast for existing conditions. 
This instruction directs the jury to consider 
damages without considering the affirmative defense 
of contributory negligence. It asks the jurors to ar-
rive at a verdict for the plaintiff without considering 
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the defendant's affirmative defense, and does not 
caution the jury to consider other instructions before 
going on to the damage question. It is argumen-
tative. 
The general rule appears to be that it is pre-
judicial error to give an instruction which purports 
to contain all the elements necessary for the verdict 
for any party, but which neither includes all of such 
elements nor refers to other instructions that do. 
Such a defect in a formula instruction is not recti-
f ed by giving of other instructions which deal with 
the omitted issue. 
In Charvoz vs. Bonneville Irrigation District 
(1951) 120 U. 480, 235 P. 2d 780, where the trial 
court gave an improper formula instruction telling 
the jury the verdict must be for the defendant and 
against the plaintiff unless the jury found the de-
fendant's negligence was the sole, proximate cause of 
the damage, our court reversed the lower court and 
said one is accountable if his negligence concurs with 
an act of God or with negligence of a stranger and 
reversed a verdict for the defendant of "No Cause 
of Action." Even more strongly, in Ivie vs. Richard-
son ( 1959), 9 U. 2d 5, 336, P. 2d 781, where a pedes-
trian was struck by an automobile, this court spoke 
out against the use of a formula instruction. Ivie 
vs. Richardson, supra, the court gave this instruction, 
No. 4: 
"Instruction No. 4 -
'If you find from a preponderance of the 
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evi~enc~ the defendant failed to keep and 
mamtam a proper lookout for the plaintiff in 
the driveway where the accident occurred and 
that such failure proximately resulted in the 
accident, then your verdict must be in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant.' The 
above instruction, taken by itself, is in error 
because it fails to take into account the possi-
ble contributory negligence of the plaintiff. 
This kind of an instruction, sometimes re-
f erred to as a formula instruction, which 
makes a recital in accordance with the conten-
tion of a party and ends with a conclusion: 
and if you so find, then your verdict must be 
for the party, is not generally a good type of 
instruction to give. This is so because it lends 
itself to error just noted, and also because it 
tends to be argumentative rather than set out 
the principals of law applicable to the issues 
impartially as to both parties. For such rea-
sons it is better to avoid giving instructions of 
this type It is conceded the issue of contribu-
tory negligence was properly covered in the 
next instruction. This, however, put one in-
struction aginst another and might have been 
confusing to the jury. 
Of more importance is the error assigned 
in giving Instruction No. 10. It states that 
the driver of a vehicle, * * * emerging from * * * 
any * * * driveway or building shall stop such 
vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a 
sidewalk * * * and shall yield the right of way 
to any pedestrian * * * to avoid collision * * *, 
this instruction is a correct statement of the 
law but is not applicable in the instant fact 
situ'ation. The plaintiff was not on a sidewalk 
or a sidewalk area. The failure of the defend-
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ant to stop, if he did, had no causative effect in 
this accident. Nor was the plaintiff in any 
area where she necessarily had the right of 
way over the defendant. It was simply a sit-
uation where each had the duty to use due care 
for the safety of themselves and each other. 
The above instruction might have had the 
~ffect, as the defendant contends, of giving the 
Jury the impression that the plaintiff was en-
titled to the right of way, and therefore was in 
error in this fact situation." (Emphasis Ad-
ded). 
The formula set out in Instruction No. 9 was in 
error because it did not state all the issues impar-
tially. It asked the jury to consider the damages 
without considering the issue on contributory negli-
gence. The instruction was argumentative, because 
it told the jurors to consider damages without de-
ciding the question of contributory negligence. It 
was improper, because it did not caution the jurors 
to consider contributory negligence before consider-
ing damages. 
Additionally, Instruction No. 9 was improper 
because it told the jurors they could find the defend-
ant was negligent in the operation of his motor 
vehicle, because he was driving too fast for existing 
conditions. The plaintiff adduced no evidence of 
speed on the part of the defendant driver, Mr. Willis. 
He was driving 20 to 25 miles per hour in a 30 mile 
posted zone. He was driving into the sun where his 
vision was obscured, but he was not speeding, and the 
i~vestigating police officer said there was no evi-
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dence of speed on his part. There was no other traf-
fic on the roadway at the time of the accident, and 
the accident would not have occurred except for the 
plaintiff's admitted sudden move into the path of the 
defendant, Mr. Willis' car. 
In Hunter vs. Michaelis (1948) 114 U. 242, 198 
P. 2d 245, where a pedestrian was struck by a car, 
and where the applicable law provided no person 
should drive a vehicle upon the highway at a speed 
that is greater than is reasonable and prudent, and 
where the posted speed limit was 25 miles an hour, 
and where the traffic was relatively light with few 
cars on the street, the court said, in reversing a ver-
dict, there is no evidence to show speed of 20 to 25 
miles per hour was excessive or unreasonable, and 
that the evidence did not justify the instruction on 
speed of the defendant's car because the negligence, 
if any, was the failure of the defendant keep a proper 
lookout. 
If it was negligence to drive at the speed the 
defendant was drivng, it was negligence to use High-
way 91 on the morning in question. It is submitted, 
in this case, our negligence, if any, was the failure to 
keep a proper lookout and not the speed at which the 
defendant was operating his automobile. 
If the jury even considered the question of negli-
gence, in view of Instruction No 1, it is probable the 
defendant driver was found negligent on an im-
proper ground not supported by the evidence, and 
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since we don't know which ground the jury found 
the defendant negligent upon, the only way to correct 
the error is to grant a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN INSTRUCTING ON DAMAGES SO AS TO MISLEAD 
JURY ON ISSUES OF LIABILITY. 
The damage instruction was No. 12 (R. 44-45). 
Following Instruction No. 12, the court gave eight 
additional instructions on liability issues ( R. 46-53). 
The court, both by giving Instruction No. 9 and again 
by giving Instruction No 12, told the jury to consider 
damages prior to considering all of the liability is-
sues. The instruction relating to the duties owed a 
pedestrian by a driver and the duties of a pedestrian 
using a crosswalk, were stated in Instruction No. 16 
(R. 49), and these duties would not have been con-
sidered by the jury at the time they ordinarily would 
have discussed damages, if they followed the se-
quence of instructions given. 
It appears the jury may well have decided the 
issue of damages prior to considering all issues re-
lating to liability. The ordinary procedure is to in-
struct the jury so that they will determine liability 
before considering damages and instructions must 
not mislead or influence the jury to consider damages 
before considering liability issues. 
Following the damage instruction, it is general-
ly customary to give a cautionary instruction advi$-
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ing the jury that from the fact they are instructed 
concerning damages that they should not assume the 
court believes that the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover. In this case, the trial court did not give a 
cautionary instruction relating to damages. 
The arrangement of the charge could hardly do 
other than give the jury the impression that they 
were to decide the damages in any event, and would 
mislead the jurors from returning a verdict in favor 
of the defendants. 
In Lund vs. Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
(1961) 12 U. of 2d 268, 365 P. 2d 633, where the 
jury was instructed to decide the damages prior to 
their determination of the issue of liability, this court 
held the instructions were misleading, and granted a 
new trial. 
In summary, it is submitted the inclusion of 
Instruction No. 12 in the middle of the charge and 
the inclusion of the last paragraph in Instruction No. 
9 telling the jurors to decide the damages after con-
sidering the issue of negligence, certainly conveyed 
to the jury the impression the trial judge was of the 
opinion the plaintiff should recover. 
Since the jury was requested to return a general 
verdict, asking the jury to determine damages gave 
them no opportunity to determine damages and also 
to return a verdict in favor of the defendants. The 
jurors were not told to sign the verdicts. 
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POINT V 
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES WERE AWARDED UNDER 
THE INFLUENCE OF IMPROPER ARGUMENT 
Mr. Eager incurred special damages totaling 
$252. 70. At the time of the trial and since he had 
left the hospital, he had taken no drugs for pain or 
discomfort. However, he said aspirin and buff erin 
made him sick and further admitted that in the hos-
pital he took a pill for pain to sleep without any 
trouble. He was earning wages of $100.00 per month 
at the time of the accident and to the time of the 
trial had missed approximately $800.00 in income. 
At the trial, Mr. Eager was up and around. His 
doctor, Dr. Ruesch gave him no per cent of partial 
disability, but did indicate he had some disability due 
to what he described as post-traumatic arthritis. 
The jury awarded Mr. Eager $10,000.00, exact-
ly the amount of liability insurance required under 
Section 41-12-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amen-
ded in 1961. 
In arguing the case to the jury, Mr. Pickett 
showed considerable enthusiasm. He told the jury 
not to consider how the defendant would pay the 
damages (Tr. 81), a statement obviously made to 
remind the jurors insurance was present. To further 
remind the jurors that they should not consider this 
man's injury from an impartial standpoint, he said 
in his closing argument (Tr. 78-79), 
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"The amounts are the lack of enjoyment 
of things that he has enjoyed before and can-
not do, do now on account of the injuries sus-
taied by the admitted negligence of the de-
fendant; I feel you're entitled, Gentlemen of 
the Jury, to figure yourself in somewhat of 
the situation of the -
MR. BERRY: I object to this as improper 
type of argument, asking the Jury to consider 
themselves in the situation of the plaintiff. 
This is asking for sympathy and passion and 
is not proper. 
THE COURT: Well, I have already in-
structed the Jury what counsel says is not 
evidence. It is merely argument. As to its 
propriety, I'm uncertain. Go ahead, Mr. Pic-
kett." 
All humane people want to sympathfae with 
injured persons Asking the jurors to put themselves 
in the place of plaintiff is perhaps the most preju-
dicial and improper type of argument experienced 
in jury trials. The natural impulse of the juror is to 
follow the "Golden Rule" and do unto others as you 
would like to have them do unto you. Supposedly, 
sympathy has no place in a law case. Theoretically, 
a party is entitled to jurors of a state of mind free 
of bias and prejudice and ones who will act impar-
tially considering the issues. To ask a juror to put 
himself in the state of mind of the plaintiff is, in 
effect, to ask him to adopt a point of view which will 
make him unqualified for jury service. 
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In Bullock vs. Branch ( 1961), ____ Fla. ____ , 130 
So. 2d 7 4, where plaintiff's counsel used a "Golden 
Rule" argument, asking jurors to determine what 
they would want for the same injuries, the appellant 
court, in reversing the lower court and in granting a 
new trial, said the prejudicial and inflammatory ef-
fect of the "Golden Rule" argument need not be 
demonstrated to show reversible error, but will be 
presumed, in that the trial court erred in failing to 
instruct the jury to disregard the argument, even in 
the absence of a motion. 
The court commented: 
"It is hard to conceive of anything that 
would more quickly destroy the structures of 
rules and principles which have been accepted 
by the courts as standards for measuring 
damages and actions of law, than for juries 
to award damages in accordance with the 
standard what they themselves would want if 
they or a loved one had received the injuries 
suffered by a plaintiff. In some cases, indee~, 
many a juror would feel that all the money m 
tlie world could not compensate him for such 
an injury to himself or his wife or children. 
Such a motion as this - identifying of the 
juror with a plaintiffs injuries-could hardly 
fail to result in injustice under our law, how-
ever, profitable it might be deemed by many 
plaintiffs in personal injury suits." 
In Russell vs. Chicago R. I. & PR Company 
(1957) 249 Iowa 664, 86 N. W. 2d 843, the court 
said where in final argument to the jury by plain-
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tiff's counsel in an action to recover for personal 
injuries, the plaintiffs' counsel asked jurors how 
much they would take to go through life injured 
as the plaintiff was, the argument was improper 
and prejudicial and affirmed an order granting a 
new trial. 
In Larson vs. Hanson (1932), an old and leading 
case on this subject, 207 Wis. 485, 242 N. W. 184, 
where the attorney for the plaintiff in a personal 
injury action had remarked to the jury that there is 
not a man in view who would trade his left arm for 
$30,000.00, and a judgment for the defendant was 
ente1·ed notwithstanding the jury verdict for the 
plaintiff, the appellant court stated that such a re-
mark clearly constituted improper argument, and 
that the trial judge had grounds for corning to the 
conclusion that his warning to the jury to disregard 
the remarks had not been effective to counteract 
a prejudicial effect. 
In Seymour vs. Richardson ( 1953), 194 Va. 
709, 75 S.E. 2d, 77, where plaintiff's counsel in clos-
ing argument said: 
"All Mrs. Richardson asks you gentlemen 
to do when you retire is to apply the Golden 
Rule. Do unto her what you wish that would 
be done." 
The argument was held improper and a judg-
ment for the plaintiff reversed. 
In Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Comp-
any vs. Kelly ( 1936) 8th Circuit Ct. of App., Minne-
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sota, it was held reversible error for plaintiff's coun-
sel in a personal injury action to ask the jurors to 
place themselves in the position of the plaintiff, the 
plaintiffs' mother or son or husband, and the court 
commented that to judge a case in that position would 
have disqualified the jurors to act as jurors and it 
was improper and prejudicial. 
In 53 Am. Jur. Trial, Section 496, Page 401, the 
general rule is stated that it is improper for an attor-
ney, in his closing argument, in a personal injury 
case, to ask the jury what compensation or what 
they would want to compensate them for the same 
lnJury. 
There are many cases on his subject. In some 
the appellant courts have not found the improper 
argument to constitute reversible error. In many of 
the cases where it has not been held reversible error, 
the defendant's attorney has failed to make a timely 
objection, and in some, he's elected to fight fire with 
fire by asking the jurors to put themselves in the 
place of the defendant, and for this reason, no re-
versible error has been found. However, as it is 
difficult to tell what influence improper argument 
has on a juror's mind, the defendants' submit that the 
cases which presume error where the argument oc-
curs and where there is a timely objection, are cor-
rect. Further, the trial judge's comment to the jury 
that he was uncertain about the propriety of the 
argument of Mr. Pickett and his instructions to him 
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to go ahead would seem to be a direction to the jurors 
to put themselves in the place of plaintiff in weighing 
the evidence, and thus the direction to the jurors to 
adopt a state of mind that would disqualify them for 
jury service under Rule 47. 
The lump sum the jury awarded is indicative 
that the jurors were thinking about something other 
than plaintiff's damages. In Ivie vs. Richardson 
(1959) 9 U. 2d 5, 336 P. 2d 781, where the amount 
of the award was out of proportion to the plaintiff's 
injury, the court took judicial notice that the award-
ing of $5,000.00, which was the amount of the Fi-
nancial Responsibility law requirement at that time, 
was an indication that they were considering insur-
ance. 
It is submitted the jury awarded $10,000.00 to 
the plaintiff because they wished to award, if at all 
possible, insurance money and nothing more or 
nothing less and that Mr. Pickett's argument was 
suggestive in causing them to do this. 
POINT VI 
THE CUMULATIVE ERRORS OF THE LOWER 
COURT REQUIRE THE DEFENDANTS BE GRANTED A 
NEW TRIAL. 
If it is clear from the record a fair trial was not 
had, in the interest of justice; a new trial should be 
granted. 
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In Ivie vs. Richardson, supra, this court said: 
"It is unnecessary and would serve no 
useful purpose for us to decide whether any 
one of the errors above discussed, considered 
separately, would constitute sufficient preju-
dicial error to require a new trial . The ques-
tion is whether the case was presented to the 
jury in such a manner that it is reasonable 
to believe there was a fair and impartial an-
alysis of the evidence and a just verdict. If 
the errors were commited which prevented 
this being done, then a new trial should be 
granted, whether it resulted from one error, or 
from several errors cumulatively. We express-
ly do not mean to say that trivia which would 
be innocuous in themselves, can be added to-
gether to make sufficient error to result in 
prejudice and reversal. The errors must be 
real and substantial and such as may reason-
ably be supposed would affect the result. How-
ever, errors of the latter character, which may 
not by themselves justify a reversal, may well, 
when considered together with others, render 
it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such 
event justice can only be served by the grant-
ing of a new trial, absent the errnrs complain-
ed of. It is so ordered. Costs to the appel-
lants." 
The defendants submit they have pointed out a 
substantial number of real and prejudicial errors 
committed in the lower court and that justice will be 
served by granting a new trial. It is expensive, one-
rous and distasteful to retry a case. However, the 
fact it is wearisome to retry a case is no excuse for 
denying a new trial. Nor is it an excuse to deny a 
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1 new trial, that the granting of one will work a hard-
ship on one of the parties. The parties, equally, are 
: entitled to a fair trial, and if for some reason a party 
i at the first trial did not receive substantially a f ai1· 
trial, justice can only be served by the retrial of the 
case. 
The defendants believe the case was not fairly 
' tried as set forth by the errors complained of in this 
brief, and that justice can only be achieved by the 
speedy granting of a new trial, absent the errors com-
plained of in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the prejudicial errors committed in 
the lower court, the judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendants should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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